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Habeas Corpus -Relief Other Than Release
Traditionally the writ of habeas corpus has been employed to
secure release from unlawful imprisonment. Through the centuries
its great object has been the liberation of unfortunates who have
been illegally deprived of their personal freedom.1 The courts of
this country have generally adopted this common law concept, 2 and
the great majority have refused to grant the writ when the pe-
titioner was lawfully in custody. They hold that there must be an
"illegal restraint" or the present means to enforce such a restraint.:
Despite the seemingly inflexible nature of these holdings and
of the established precedent, attempts have been made to utilize
the writ, by persons lawfully confined, for the purpose of securing
relief other than release. Although the majority of these have been
unsuccessful, they represent an inroad on the accepted concepts,
and, as such, have produced a growing conflict in court decisions.
This is illustrated by the statement of a Maryland court in a recent
opinion to the effect that "whether habeas corpus is ever available
to a prisoner who, though lawfully in custody, seeks such remedy
upon the ground that he has been subjected to unlawful treatment
is a question upon which the courts are not in entire agreement."4
It should be noted that cases involving the resort to habeas
corpus when a prisoner has been denied credit for good conduct
resulting in excessive sentence5 are to be distinguished from the
type under discussion, for in such cases the request for a writ is
based on the theory that at least some period of the confinement
is unlawful.
CASES HOLDING HABEAS CORPUS PROPER ONLY TO
SECURE DISCHARGE
In England in 1843 the Court of Queen's Bench, in a case in
which the prisoner complained that imprisonment in a certain part
of the prison was not in accordance with the terms of the sentence,
stated that the object of habeas corpus was "to restore liberty and
not pronounce judgment as to the room or part of the prison in
which the prisoner ought to be confined." 6 The case of Sarshik v.
Sanford is the latest of a line of lower federal court cases which
' BAILEY, HABEAS CORPUS (1913).
- McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934).
'McNally v. Hill, supra, note 2; United States ex rel. DeLucia v. O'Dono-
van, 82 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1948); Dunlap v. Swope, 103 F. 2d 19 (9th Cir.
1939).
'Bernard v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction, 187 Md. 273, 49 A.
2d 737 (1946).
' Carroll v. Squier, 136 F. 2d 571 (9th Cir. 1943).
'Ex parte Rogers, 7 THE JURIST 992 (1843).
"142 F. 2d 676 (5th Cir. 1944).
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have denied the writ. It held that "the courts have no function to
superintend the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary, but
only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there."
Using the same reasoning the state courts of New York, Ohio,
Texas, and Nebraska have recently refused relief,8 the Nebraska
court opining that, "In the absence of a special statute authorizing
it, habeas corpus is not available for the purpose of inquiry into
the legality of a particular form, manner or place of confinement
executively or administratively imposed upon a prisoner lawfully
in custody under a valid judgment." The Supreme Court of the
United States has also declared that habeas corpus as a remedy
should be used solely to obtain the discharge of a prisoner.9
CASES HOLDING HABEAS CORPUS IMPROPER IF OTHER
REMEDY AvAILABLE
A second class of cases, in refusing the writ when it was sought
for relief other than discharge, has relied not upon the above-
mentioned rule, but rather upon one equally well established, the
rule that habeas corpus will not lie if there is avaliable any other
adequate remedy.,' English and Canadian courts have so held.1
An Oklahoma court in two cases in which the prisoner complained
that he was held in solitary confinement and placed on a bread and
water diet, said that "relief will not be granted by habeas corpus
until the legal remedies provided by law have been denied or ex-
hausted without relief."' 2 It is pointed out that under a state statute
the prisoner could complain to the Board of Prison Control or ap-
peal to the Governor. A series of recent Maryland cases based on
State ex rel Renner v. Tright"3 has also held that a prisoner alleg-
ing mistreatment by prison officials should protest to the State
Board of Correction rather than seek a writ of habeas corpus. 4
A New York court has indicated that other relief first should be
People v. Slattery, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 11 (1942) ; Ex parte Lee, 85 N.E. 2d 135
(1948). (Based on a statute which corresponds to the common law); Ex parte
Thompson, 32 Tex. Crim. Rep. 274, 22 S.W. 876 (1893) ; Application of Dunn,
150 Neb. 669, 35 N.W. 2d 673 (1949). But see In re Tani, 29 Nev. 385, 91
Pac. 137 (1907).
'cNally v. Hill, supra, note 2; United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317
U.S. 1 (1942); Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuele, 329 U.S. 304 (1946).
'.,Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393 (1923); Berkoff v. Humphrey, 159 F. 2d 5
(8th Cir. 1947); Byrd v. Pescor, 163 F. 2d 775 (8th Cir. 1947).
'Ex parte Cobbett, 136 Eng. Rep. 940 (1848); Beaudin v. Landriault, 38
Con. Crim. Cas. 12 (1921).
'Ex parte Terrill, 47 Okla. Crim. Rep. 92, 287 Pac. 753 (1930) ; Ex parte
Perry, 47 Okla. Cr. Rep. 156, 287 Pac. 755 (1930).
- 188 Md. 189, 51 A. 2d 668 (1947).
" State ex rel. Jacobs v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 59 A. 2d 753
(1948); State ex rel. Baldwin v. Superintendent of Maryland State Reforma-
tory for Males, 63 A. 2d 323 (1949).
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sought.15 The fact that these courts have entertained requests for
relief other than release without immediately dismissing them on
the basis of the limitation discussed in the preceding paragraph
seems to indicate an attitude of increasing liberalization on the
part of some jurisdictions.
Possibly, since these courts generally imply that "the problem
is for the other branches of the government,"1 6 the concept of sep-
aration of powers and a hesitancy to usurp particular functions of
other branches of government is, in these situations, the principal
cause of the courts' reluctance to grant the writ. None of these
cases, however, discusses the propriety of granting the writ if the
petitioner alleges that he has exhausted all remedies available in
the other branches of government without obtaining relief.
CASES GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS FOR RELIEF
OTHER THAN DISCHARGE
A few cases which well may be regarded as a third and liberal
class have allowed a habeas corpus proceeding in the type of situa-
tion under discussion despite the limitations which controlled in
the two classes already considered.
In Ex parte Rider, 7 the prisoner complained that she was pre-
vented by prison authorities from privately conferring with her
lawyer. The court granted the writ saying:
A person may be said to be unlawfully restrained of his lib-
erty so as to be entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when,
though lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to
which, even in confinement, he is lawfully entitled under the
Constitution or laws of this state of the United States, the
deprivation whereof serves to make his imprisonment more
onerous than the law allows. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
The court In re Kemmerer 8 declared that if the petitioner was
suffering any unusual punishment he could always present a peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus. In In re Pinaire,9 the court
allowed a habeas corpus proceeding but decided that the method of
treatment for nervousness, about which the petitioner complained,
was proper under the circumstances. The leading case of this lib-
eral classification is a federal court case, Coffin v. Reichard.20 In
that instance, an inmate of a United States Public Health Service
Hospital presented a petition in a United States District Court
requesting permission to file for a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that he was being cruelly treated by guards of that institu-
People v. Slattery, 38 N.Y.S. 2d 11 (1942).
"People v. Slattery, supra, note 15.
50 Cal. App. 797, 195 Pac. 965 (1920).
309 Mich. 313, 15 N.W. 2d 652 (1944).
'46 F. Supp. 113 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
143 F. 2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
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lion. The District Court dismissed the petition whereupon the peti-
tioner appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court, in its opinion, said:
Any unlawful restraint of personal liberty may be inquired
into on habeas corpus. In re Bon-er, 151 U.S. 242, 14 S. Ct.
323, 38 L. Ed. 149. This rule applies although a person is in
lawful custody. His conviction and incarceration deprive
him only of such liberties as the law has ordained he shall
suffer for his transgressions.
A prisoner is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus when,
though lawfully in custody, he is deprived of some right to
which he is lawfully entitled even in his confinement, the
deprivation of which serves to make his imprisonment more
burdensome than the law allows or curtails his liberty to a
greater extent than the law permits. Logan v. United States,
144 U.S. 263, 12 S. Ct. 617, 36 L. Ed. 429.
When a man possesses a substantial right, the courts will be
diligent in finding a way to protect it. The fact that a person
is legally impiisoned does not prevent the use of habeas cor-
pus to protect his other inherent rights.
28 U. S. C. A. 461 authorizes the court in habeas corpus pro-
ceeding to dispose of the party as "law and justice require."
The judge is not limited to a simple remand or discharge of
the prisoner, but he may remand, with directions that the
prisoner's retained civil rights be respected, or the court
may order the prisoner placed in the custody of the Attorney
General of the United States for transfer to some other in-
stitution.
A request by the government for certiorari was denied by the
Supreme Court.21
Under Sections 451 and 452 of Title 28, United States Code
(1946), the scope of the writ has been held to be the same as under
the common law ;*' but Section 461 of Title 28, United States Code
(1946) cited above in Co.fin v. Reichrd,2 has been interpreted by
some federal courts to be an extension of the common law writ.24
The language of the latter section has been retained in the amend-
ment of Title 2825 with the exception of the word "party" has been
replaced by the word "matter" which may signify an intention to
further extend the scope of the writ.
The various attitudes which have motivated the courts in reach-
ing their conclusions in this third class of cases are apparently
as follows:
1. Requests for the writ of habeas corpus are not to be tech-
nically considered, but liberally regarded.
26
-325 U.S. 887 (1944).
Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876).
'See note 21, su'pra.
"Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160 (1890); Bryant v. United States, 214
Fed. 51 (Sth Cir. 1914) ; Whitaker v. Mathues, 9 F. 2d 913 (3rd Cir. 1925).
z62 SrAT. 965 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §2243 (Supp. 1946).
Holiday v. Johnston, 313 U.S. 342 (1941).
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2. The term "illegal restraint" does not connote a confine-
ment or imprisonment totally illegal, but any restraint of
liberty, any denial of a right occuring during a lawful
detention.
3. The judicial branch of the government should consider
complaints of petitioners for the writ of habeas corpus
and if necessary order that corrective measures be taken
although the petitioner may not have exhausted all rem-
edies available including those through other branches
of the government.
4. The writ of habeas corpus may be used as a vehicle to ac-
complish step 3 and is no longer regarded as a device, the
use of which must result, in the event of a finding in favor
of the person invoking it, in complete discharge from
custody.
HABEAS CoRPus As REMEDY
The recency of most of the cases having as their objective the
securing of a remedy other than complete release, and the fact that
many such requests for the writ of habeas corpus are now being
made which are not found in reported cases 27 seem to indicate that
the courts will be increasingly confronted with the problem of
whether or not the writ is proper under these circumstances. It
is suggested that if the concept of habeas corpus is held to be that
set out in step 4 above, the courts in the interests of justice, par-
ticularly in those instances where the person detained has been
unsuccessful in obtaining deserved relief through entreaty directed
to the executive branch of the government, should liberally regard
petitions for the writ. If, however, the interpretation of the writ
is such that unless the unlawful condition is corrected release is
mandatory, granting the writ would certainly be unreasonable. To
loose upon society an individual who admittedly should be detained
simply because of a wrong perpetrated against him by another
would be absurd. It is doubtful that all courts will early agree on
either of these theories.
The legislatures of the various jurisdictions, both federal and
state, could do much to clarify the issue if they would plaintly de-
fine what is meant by the term "any unlawful restraint or deten-
tion" and would also declare whether a habeas corpus proceeding
must necessarily result in complete release or something less than
that.
Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 FED. RULES
DEC. 313 (1948).
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OTHER POSSIBLE REMEDIES
To avoid the existing confusion in the courts in attempting to
cope with this problem, it would perhaps be more desirable to have
available other means of obtaining relief. The alleviation of a
prisoner's plight might be accomplished by reliance on the criminal
sanction or civil liability imposed by the Civil Rights Act.28 It
might also be accomplished by the issuance of a writ of mandamus;
but this writ is generally classified as an extraordinary legal remedy
and certain definite requisites must exist before the courts will
recognize a petition for it. The right of the petitioner must be
clear and the duty of the officer, performance of which is to be
commanded, must be plainly defined and ministerial rather than
discretionary. 29 Because of this inflexible nature of mandamus, it
seems clear that to rely on it to solve the problem presented in the
type of case under discussion would be unsatisfactory.
A better solution apparently lies in bringing injunction pro-
ceedings against the party responsible for the unlawful treatment.
It is the general rule that equity will not protect personal rights and
interests ;3 however, in recent years this doctrine has been severely
attacked, and many courts have enjoined acts which were an in-
fringement on these rights, although recognizing a vague property
right as the basis for such action.31
CONCLUSION
Considering the above remedies, together with that of habeas
corpus, in the light of their applicability to the type of case dis-
cussed in this article, it appears that the equitable remedy, the
injunction proceeding, is perhaps the most reasonable and practi-
cal; therefore, a suggested solution to the problem presented by a
request for relief other than release is the acceptance by the courts
of the injunction as a method of protecting personal rights and
liberties and the employment of it to grant relief without altering
the lawful detention of the complainant.
J. Robert Donnelly
Gordon v. Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Ill. 1948).
United States ex rel. Roughton v. Ickes, 101 F. 2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 426 (2d Ed. 1948).
McCIINTOCK, EQUITY 426 (2d Ed. 1948); Moscovitz, Civil Liberties and
Injunctive Protection, 39 ILL. L. REv. 144 (1944).
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